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ABSTRACT 
  The climate-policy debate has only recently turned its full attention 
to adaptation—how to address the impacts of the climate change that 
we have already begun to experience and that will likely increase over 
time. Legal scholars have in turn begun to explore how the many 
different fields of law will and should respond. During this nascent 
period, one overarching question has gone unexamined: How will the 
legal system as a whole organize around climate change adaptation? 
Will a new, distinct field of climate adaptation law and policy emerge, 
or will legal institutions simply work away at the problem through 
unrelated, self-contained fields, as in the famous Law of the Horse? 
This Article is the first to examine that question comprehensively, to 
move beyond thinking about the law and climate change adaptation 
to consider the law of climate change adaptation. 
  Part I of the Article lays out our methodological premises and 
approach. Using a model we call Stationarity Assessment, Part I 
explores how legal fields are structured and sustained based on 
assumptions about the variability of natural, social, and economic 
conditions, and how disruptions to that regime of variability can lead 
to the emergence of new fields of law and policy. Case studies of 
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environmental law and environmental justice demonstrate the model’s 
predictive power for the formation of new, distinct legal regimes. 
  Part II applies the Stationarity Assessment model to the topic of 
climate change adaptation, using a case study of a hypothetical coastal 
region to demonstrate the potential for climate change impacts to 
disrupt relevant legal doctrines and institutions. We find that most 
fields of law appear to be capable of adapting effectively to climate 
change. In other words, without some active intervention, we expect 
the law and policy of climate change adaptation to follow the path of 
the Law of the Horse—a collection of fields independently adapting 
to climate change—rather than organically coalescing into a new and 
distinct field. 
  Part III explores why, notwithstanding this conclusion, it may still 
be desirable to seek a different trajectory. Focusing on the likelihood 
of systemic adaptation decisions with perverse and harmful results, we 
identify the potential benefits offered by intervening to shape a new 
and distinct field of climate adaptation law and policy. Part IV then 
identifies the contours of such a field, exploring the distinct purposes 
of reducing vulnerability, ensuring resiliency, and safeguarding 
equity. These features provide the normative policy components for a 
law of climate change adaptation that would be more than just a Law 
of the Horse. This new field would not replace or supplant any 
existing field, however, as environmental law did with regard to 
nuisance law, and it would not be dominated by substantive doctrine. 
Rather, like the field of environmental justice, this new legal regime 
would serve as a holistic overlay across other fields to ensure more 
efficient, effective, and just climate adaptation solutions. 
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  A few years ago, at a conference on the “Law of Cyberspace” 
held at the University of Chicago, Judge Frank Easterbrook told the 
assembled listeners . . . that there was no more a “law of cyberspace” 
than there was a “Law of the Horse”; that the effort to speak as if 
there were such a law would just muddle rather than clarify; and that 
legal academics (“dilettantes”) should just stand aside as judges and 
lawyers and technologists worked through the quotidian problems 
that this souped-up telephone would present. “Go home,” in effect, 
was Judge Easterbrook’s welcome.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is here. Its impacts are present in the current 
landscape,2 and, barring miraculous developments in politics and 
technology, it will be a part of the future for our generation and for 
 
 1. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 501, 501 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the 
Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–16 (presenting a written version of the 
speech quoted in the text). The “Law of the Horse” is an old catch phrase used to refer to an 
unnecessary effort to bring together unrelated and duly self-contained bodies of law. See id. at 
207 (“Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still more 
deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with 
prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on ‘The Law of the 
Horse’ is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles.”). Judge Easterbrook credits the 
phrase to Karl Llewellyn. Id. at 214 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 
HARV. L. REV. 725, 735, 737 (1939); and Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle To Unhorse Sales, 
52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939)). 
 2. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 72 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/—
publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm (“Many natural systems, on 
all continents and in some oceans, are being affected by regional climate changes. Observed 
changes in many physical and biological systems are consistent with warming.”); U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
9 (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-
report.pdf (“Observations show that warming of the climate is unequivocal. The global warming 
observed over the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping 
gases.”). 
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many to follow.3 By our very nature, humans are adaptable creatures, 
but those skills will surely be put to the test in the face of changes in 
sea level, surface temperature, rainfall, snowmelt, ecosystems, and a 
myriad of other shifting conditions, some gradual and some abrupt.4 
For some people, in some places, changes will be for the better—
think agriculture in Siberia—while for other people in other places 
the prospect is dire—consider the low-lying Solomon Islands.5 The 
challenge is clear, the question obvious: What should law and policy 
do about the impacts of climate change?6 
 
 3. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 72 
(“Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries even if [greenhouse-
gas] emissions were to be reduced sufficiently for [greenhouse-gas] concentrations to stabilise, 
due to the time scales associated with climate processes and feedbacks.”); V. Ramanathan & Y. 
Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable 
Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14,245, 14,245 (2008) (estimating a committed 
warming of 2.4oC even if greenhouse-gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan 
Solomon, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Reto Knutti & Pierre Friedlingstein, Irreversible Climate 
Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) 
(estimating a one-thousand-year committed warming effect).  
 4. For overviews of the likely global and domestic impacts, see generally 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; and U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2. 
 5. Climate change is not all about harms—there will be benefits in many forms for many 
regions of human populations and for many species. Agriculture in the United States, for 
example, may find benefits from warming temperatures, increased precipitation, and higher 
carbon-dioxide levels. See Olivier Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of 
Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather, 97 
AM. ECON. REV. 354, 355 (2007) (“If anything, climate change appears to be slightly beneficial 
for profits and yields.”). In particular, and of relief to many, “the production of high-quality 
wine grapes is expected to benefit from a warmer climate because of a longer growing season 
and more favorable growing conditions in the short-term.” CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, 2009 
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 94 (2009), available at http://resources.ca.gov/ 
climate_adaptation/docs/Statewide_Adaptation_Strategy.pdf. Most of the national-scale 
economic-impact studies show Russia and Eastern Europe as best off under a range of climate 
change scenarios, with small to substantial increases in GDP, and Africa, parts of Asia, and 
small island states as worst off. See RICHARD S.J. TOL, AN ANALYSIS OF MITIGATION AS A 
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://fixtheclimate.com/ 
uploads/tx_templavoila/AP_Mitigation_Tol_v_3.0.pdf (presenting a chart based on synthesis of 
over a dozen economic studies). For an examination of the impact of climate change on small 
islands, see infra note 134. 
 6. For summaries of the legal and policy issues likely to come with climate change, 
including reviews and syntheses of scientific and legal literature on the topic, see generally 
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty 
Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity 
Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law That 
Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45 (2010); Robert L. 
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive 
RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:14 PM 
2013]   CLIMATE CHANGE MEETS LAW OF THE HORSE 979 
The answer is equally clear: climate change adaptation.7 We must 
adapt to our new circumstances in their many specific settings as best 
we can. On that much we can all agree. Alas, what this adaptation 
entails is far less clear. Like the early explorers’ maps that filled in 
distant seas and lands with the hopeful, enigmatic phrase, terra 
incognita, there is no analog from humanity’s climate past on which to 
chart humanity’s climate future.8 
Given the daunting challenges of this uncertain future, 
decisionmakers are increasingly concerned about the “adaptation 
deficit” in climate change law and policy that has amassed over time.9 
Until very recently, the focus on climate change mitigation, 
particularly reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, has held center 
stage.10 Debates over mitigation—how much and how fast to reduce 
causes of climate change—largely crowded out considerations of 
 
Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833 (2009); and J.B. Ruhl, Climate 
Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 
365–71 (2010).  
 7. Climate change “adaptation” refers to “measures to improve our ability to cope with or 
avoid harmful impacts and take advantage of beneficial ones, now and in the future.” U.S. 
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 8.  
 8. Ecologists now warn of the no-analog future—ecological variability unprecedented in 
the history of ecology, riddled with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously 
unknown emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change. See, e.g., Matthew C. 
Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution Models and the 
Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 (2009) (“By 
2100, a quarter or more of the Earth’s land surface may experience climatic conditions that have 
no modern analog . . . . [L]ittle information exists to predict how species may respond under 
[these] novel environments.”); Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 
823 (2007) (“[I]f the climate changes over the next 100 years as current models predict, surviving 
species throughout much of Earth’s land area will not simply migrate north and south en masse 
as unchanging communities, as Charles Darwin once believed. Instead, they are likely to be 
reshuffled into novel ecosystems unknown today.”); Douglas Fox, When Worlds Collide, 
CONSERVATION, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28, 31 (arguing that it is likely that the world will enter into 
a no-analog future within one hundred to two hundred years).  
 9. See Ian Burton, Climate Change and the Adaptation Deficit, in THE EARTHSCAN 
READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 89, 90–92 (E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton 
eds., 2009) (describing economic losses that have resulted from unpreparedness for weather 
catastrophes related to climate change, and noting the “demand for attention to adaptation” at 
meetings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
 10. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 365–66 (“[T]he policy world’s fixation on achieving, or 
blocking, federal greenhouse gas emission legislation as part of our national strategy for climate 
change mitigation has contributed to our neglect of national policy for climate change 
adaptation.” (footnote omitted)). Climate change “mitigation” refers to “measures to reduce 
climate change by, for example, reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases and particles, or 
increasing removal of heat-trapping gases from the atmosphere.” U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 11. 
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adaptation—how best to manage the impacts of climate change.11 
Only now, facing the stark realities of the United Nations climate 
negotiations12 and the failure to pass climate legislation in Congress,13 
has climate-policy dialogue in the United States started to shift 
ground to incorporate adaptation as a significant policy component.14 
It stands to reason that the demands of climate change 
adaptation will present new kinds of challenges and conflicts for 
public and private legal institutions. It is no surprise, therefore, that a 
flood of recent scholarship has focused on the implications of climate 
change adaptation for the law––exploring how law will adapt in fields 
as varied as insurance, environmental, immigration, water supply, 
torts, energy, and property, to name just a few––while crosscutting 
issues such as federalism and human rights are also receiving careful 
attention.15 
Some scholars, however, have gone beyond examining discrete 
fields of law, predicting that climate change adaptation could become 
a broadly transformative agent of legal change. For example, 
Professor Robin Craig argues that climate change adaptation will 
demand both “new ways of thinking about law” and “a new legal 
framework,”16 and offers ideas about some core principles of this 
 
 11. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 365–70 (recounting the history of policy attention to 
mitigation at the expense of attention to adaptation). 
 12. With the collapse of negotiations at Copenhagen, the prospect of global caps on 
greenhouse-gas emissions has become remote. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Where Did Global 
Warming Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011, at A1.  
 13. Although the House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), climate legislation 
died in the Senate, and there has been no attempt to reintroduce legislation. During the 2012 
presidential campaign, none of the presidential candidates pushed the prospect of new 
legislation. See, e.g., GOP Presidential Hopefuls Shift on Global Warming, USA TODAY (May 
27, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2011-05-27-presidential-hopefuls-global-
warming_n.htm. In President Obama’s first press conference following his reelection, he 
signaled that climate change legislation would not be a top priority in his second term. Andrew 
Restuccia, President Obama Says Climate Change To Take Backseat to Economy, POLITICO 
(Nov. 14, 2012, 4:19 PM EST), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83865.html. 
 14. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 370–75 (discussing this shift in focus). The consensus now is 
that “mitigation and adaptation are both essential parts of a comprehensive climate change 
response strategy,” though much remains to be worked out. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 11.  
 15. For a broad survey of the legal literature on climate change adaptation, see Ruhl, supra 
note 6, at 391–432. For a reference book with chapters on agriculture, energy systems, 
insurance, financing, and more, see generally THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS (Michael Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 
2012).  
 16. Craig, supra note 6, at 17. 
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“new climate change adaptation law.”17 Nor is she alone. A growing 
number of commentators believe that climate change will impose 
radical changes on society and that the law will, perforce, need to 
adapt in similarly radical ways.18 
These are bold claims with significant implications for the 
evolution of legal doctrine and institutions. But will the profound 
need for social and economic adaptations to climate change create an 
equally profound need for legal adaptations? If so, are those 
adaptations likely to evolve through incremental changes across 
numerous existing fields of law, or will they demand the formation of 
a new, distinct field of climate adaptation law? To paraphrase Judge 
Easterbrook’s quote at the head of this Article,19 it remains to be seen 
whether law and policy for climate change adaptation will evolve as a 
disconnected Law of the Horse or coalesce into a coherent field—
whether it becomes a law and climate change adaptation or a law of 
climate change adaptation. 
Nor is the and/of distinction merely a semantic quibble. As law 
school course offerings seem designed to prove, there can be a law 
and anything. Law of implies something more, that there is a need for 
the legal system to respond to change from outside by changing inside 
at a more fundamental level. This Article is therefore intended to 
initiate a debate over the potential trajectories of climate adaptation 
law, examining not only whether a new, distinct field is likely to 
coalesce around the policies implicated by climate change adaptation 
 
 17. See id. at 17, 40–69 (suggesting and elaborating upon five broad principles that, 
implemented over time, can effectively guide the law’s response to climate change). 
 18. See, e.g., Carl Bruch, The End of Equilibrium, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 30, 35 
(outlining the need for “adaptation law”); John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change 
Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (describing the emergence of “climate change 
law” at “the intersection of several areas of law, including environmental law, energy law, 
business law, and international law”); Jan McDonald, The Role of Law in Adapting to Climate 
Change, 2 CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 284 (2011) (proposing “design requirements of a legal 
framework for addressing the peculiar challenges posed by climate change risks”); Jacqueline 
Peel, Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 922, 
924 (2008) (“[D]evising legal solutions to climate change is likely to involve profound changes to 
existing governance and regulatory frameworks, with reverberations felt in many other areas of 
law such as constitutional law, administrative law and property law.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Legal Disputes Related to Climate Change Will Continue for a Century, 42 Envtl. L. 1257, 1273 
(2012) (arguing that the “steps we must take to adapt to climate change…will involve major 
changes in the legal environment”); Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: 
Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 82 (2007) (“Environmental law, 
as it stands or as it might be foreseeably reconfigured, may lack the capacity to respond to the 
threats posed by adaptation to climate change.”). 
 19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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but, more to the point, whether one should. We take a close look at 
whether and how lawyers could purposively take part in that creation 
moment—to choose whether to let the Law of the Horse run its 
course or to pursue a law of climate change adaptation. 
Precisely because the future trajectory remains uncertain, the 
time to engage in this analysis is now. Decisions made today about 
climate change adaptation––whether shaping the course of evolution 
or sitting back and watching the drama unfold––may become 
“sticky,” leading to path dependence and making it increasingly 
difficult to change course if the need becomes apparent.20 If the stakes 
are high, as they are likely to be with climate change, it is worth 
thinking now about how to avoid going down the wrong path. 
To make this discussion more concrete, consider the case of 
environmental law, regarded as one of the most complex and 
specialized fields of practice, with many of its own distinct problems, 
doctrines, tools, institutions, and methods.21 The need for a law of the 
environment may seem self-evident today, but its emergence as a 
distinct field is relatively recent. The very term “environmental law” 
did not even exist before 1969.22 In the 1970s, policymakers, lawyers, 
activists, and legal scholars explicitly conceived of the law of the 
environment as something more than just a bunch of unrelated legal 
challenges that happened to intersect at the common factual ground 
of the human impact on nature.23 A similar story could be told about 
the field of environmental justice and its genesis in the late 1980s to 
manage the distributional effects of environmental, land use, and 
other policy realms.24 Recognized today as significant and separate 
 
 20. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 631, 641 n.161 (2001) 
(“[C]haracteristics of the common law process lead a particular resolution of a legal issue to 
become locked in; courts find it increasingly difficult to depart from the path once the first few 
steps are taken.”). 
 21. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal 
Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 251–82 (2010) (arguing that, despite doctrinal variation 
and even incoherence, identifiable core patterns frame environmental law as a discrete legal 
field). 
 22. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47 (2004) (describing 
key players behind the formation of environmental law). 
 23. See id. at 79–84 (describing the 1970s as a “new era” during which stringent 
Congressional oversight of agencies, citizen suits initiated pursuant to new statutes, and an 
enthusiastic, exacting judiciary all combined to “serve[] an essential supporting role in 
maintaining environmental law”). 
 24. The field of environmental justice law exploded in dimensions during the 1990s. See 
generally, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
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areas of theory and practice, the origins of environmental law and 
environmental justice as distinct legal fields were intentional. 
Ocean-management policy provides a clear contrast. For 
decades, laws relating to the oceans took a passive Law-of-the-Horse 
approach that virtually all policymakers and scholars now consider to 
have produced a dysfunctional and ineffective legal regime.25 
Accreting over time, today the “Law of the Oceans” comprises a 
crazy quilt of twenty federal agencies overseeing 140 statutes.26 Long 
entrenched in this Law-of-the-Horse approach, recent and repeated 
calls to overhaul this patchwork into a consolidated, coherent field of 
law centered around oceans management have gained little traction.27 
Despite best efforts, it remains a Law of the Horse. 
Part I thus opens the inquiry by examining what it means to refer 
to a new and distinct field of law and why it is important to anticipate 
when one may be needed for effective implementation of emerging 
policy goals. To probe when new fields are likely to form, we develop 
an analytical framework known as a Stationarity Assessment. 
Extending the recent work of water-resource managers,28 a 
Stationarity Assessment assesses why and when distinct fields evolve 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998); KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AND JUSTICE: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1st 
ed. 1995); DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1st ed. 
1996); Symposium, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425 
(1994); Symposium, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 
(1992). For thorough bibliographies of the deep and broad environmental justice literature that 
had developed even by the mid-1990s, see generally Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of 
Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,543 (1995); and Carita 
Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997). 
 25. See, e.g., L.B. Crowder et al., Resolving Mismatches in U.S. Ocean Governance, 313 
SCIENCE 617, 617 (2006) (“Historically, ocean management has focused on individual 
sectors. . . . Separate regimes for fisheries, aquaculture, marine mammal conservation, shipping, 
oil and gas, and mining are designed to resolve conflicts within sectors, but not across sectors.”); 
Christopher Shane Studley, Ocean Policy and Change: Is There Hope for Ocean Reform?, 18 
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 105, 105–11 (2009) (tracing the development of the United States’s 
“fractured and dysfunctional national policy for ocean management”). 
 26. Crowder et al., supra note 25, at 617. 
 27. Professor Larry Crowder and his coauthors argue that because the declining ocean 
conditions “are largely due to failures of governance, reversing them will require new, more 
effective governance systems,” yet they recognize that “these governance problems are difficult 
to alleviate even after they become well understood.” Id. at 617–18; see also Studley, supra note 
25, at 111–31 (providing an overview of proposed reforms but concluding that “[t]here are many 
obstacles to overcome before ocean policy reform occurs”). 
 28. See P.C.D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M. Hirsch, Zbigniew W. 
Kundzewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier & Ronald J. Stouffer, Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water 
Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573 (2008). 
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in response to disruptions to those fields’ underlying natural, social, 
and economic foundations. Part I explains the details of the 
Stationarity Assessment model and applies it to the histories of 
environmental law and environmental justice to demonstrate its 
explanatory power. 
Part II applies the Stationarity Assessment model to a case study 
of climate change adaptation in a diverse coastal region feeling the 
environmental, social, and economic effects of climate change. Rising 
mean surface temperatures, sea-level rise, changes in precipitation, 
and other changes are likely to present pressing and in some cases 
novel kinds of legal issues, but we find that for most purposes a Law-
of-the-Horse approach will be adequate—existing doctrines and 
institutions in the relevant fields of law can effectively adapt to the 
changed conditions. In a small number of fields, however, notably 
those with foundations that rest heavily on stationarity assumptions 
of biophysical conditions, the law will be put under such intense 
pressure that current doctrines and institutions will need to respond 
with more deliberate and potentially substantial adaptation. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that there is little reason to believe that 
even these fields will radically transform when faced with the 
challenges of climate change adaptation. In short, it is difficult to 
envision how climate change adaptation will necessitate dramatic 
transformations of the doctrinal foundations and institutional 
architecture of any particular field of law, much less lead to the 
organic evolution of a new field of climate adaptation law. 
Part III explores why, notwithstanding this conclusion, it may 
still be desirable to seek a different trajectory, to intervene 
intentionally and create a new and distinct field of climate adaptation 
law and policy. Adapting to the impacts of climate change will vary 
depending on each location’s geography and vulnerabilities. As a 
result, any need for new substantive law and policy will likely be 
place- and topic-specific. At the systemic level, however, adaptation 
decisions will implicate multiple actors and concerns across different 
landscapes, sectors, and communities. It is at this systemic scale that a 
new field focused on procedure rather than substance would be most 
useful to guard against and manage unintended, perverse responses to 
climate change impacts. 
This conclusion has major implications for how lawyers and legal 
institutions approach climate change adaptation. Part IV thus 
identifies the contours of such a nascent field, exploring adaptation’s 
distinct goals of reducing vulnerability, ensuring resiliency, and 
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safeguarding equity. These features provide the normative 
components for a law of climate change adaptation that would make 
it more than just a Law of the Horse. The climate adaptation field we 
envision, however, would not replace or supplant any existing field, as 
environmental law did with regard to nuisance law,29 and it would not 
be dominated by substantive doctrine, as is largely the case under 
environmental law. Rather, as environmental justice has done for 
environmental, land use, and public-infrastructure-and-services law,30 
this new field would function as a procedural overlay to ensure more 
efficient, effective, and just climate adaptation solutions across the 
spectrum of other legal fields. 
I.  ANTICIPATING NEW LEGAL FIELDS 
Legal scholars since the heyday of the legal realism movement 
have considered what makes fields of law distinct, why lawyers refer 
to this field of law and that field of law, but not others, and whether 
fields should be defined by their structure or focus of study.31 
Notwithstanding this rich scholarly history, “no ultimate authority 
exists for defining a field of law.”32 It may simply be that “a field may 
be defined by its own practitioners for their purposes or tastes. The 
test of its validity lies in whether others accept it.”33 Whether others 
should accept the pronouncement of new fields lay at the heart of the 
cyberspace law debate captured by Judge Easterbrook’s comments. 
This Part draws on the tensions of that debate and considers what it 
means generally to describe a collection of laws and policies as a field 
and why new fields of law emerge. 
A. On the Law of the Horse and Why It Matters 
There is no better starting point for considering what makes a 
field of law distinct and useful than the classic nonfield of law—the 
fabled “Law of the Horse.” There is, of course, no coherent Law of 
the Horse, which was the point of Judge Easterbrook’s derisive 
comments. Legal issues concerning horses arise across a range of 
 
 29. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 30. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 31. See Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an Architecture of Health Law, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 67, 
79–82 (2009) (describing the process by which various legal fields have arisen, with attention to 
the different approaches that have been employed to define these discrete fields). 
 32. Id. at 82. 
 33. Id.  
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practice fields—veterinary law, racing law, agricultural law, consumer 
law, and so on.34 This is not merely an equine observation. Take rain, 
for example. It falls on many aspects of our lives, but it would be 
nonsensical to think of “rain law” as a distinct field. Rather, questions 
as varied as who has rights to rain once it falls, whether someone can 
treat clouds to induce or prevent rain, how event planners can insure 
against unwanted rain, liability for damages from rain, and how to 
respond to flooding from too much rain are divvied out to a broad 
variety of public- and private-law fields.35 To describe someone as a 
“horse lawyer” or a “rain lawyer,” in other words, is meaningless. 
Hence Judge Easterbrook’s challenge to self-proclaimed 
cyberspace lawyers a decade ago. Although everyone acknowledged 
that the Internet and its allied technologies had ushered in 
remarkable changes, it was less clear that this compelled the 
development of a correspondingly distinct “Law of Cyberspace.” 
Easterbrook argued that there was no need for anything of the sort, 
that the Law of Cyberspace was a meaningless fiction no more useful 
than a Law of the Horse.36 There might be plenty of new legal issues 
associated with the emergence and growth of cyberspace, but judges 
and lawyers could effectively adapt existing doctrines, tools, and 
methods of law across a multitude of fields to work through them, 
albeit sometimes in novel and different combinations and 
applications.37 
Similarly, climate change will put pressure on law to adapt, of 
that there is no doubt. But is the idea of a “Law of Climate Change 
Adaptation,” like the “Law of Cyberspace,” no more than a fatuous 
 
 34. See supra note 1. To be fair, though, some do speak of horse law. The law firm of 
Foster Swift, for example, maintains the Equine Law Blog. EQUINE LAW BLOG, FOSTER SWIFT 
COLLINS & SMITH P.C., http://www.equinelawblog.com. 
 35. As some simple searches in Westlaw and Lexis databases demonstrated to us, law and 
commentary on all of these issues are easy to locate through traditional legal research, whereas 
after similar efforts to find law and commentary on a distinct “law of rain” or “rain law” field of 
theory or practice, we can confirm that it does not exist.  
 36. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207 (“When asked to talk about ‘Property in 
Cyberspace,’ my immediate reaction was, ‘Isn’t this just the law of the horse?’”). 
 37. As Judge Easterbrook explained: 
Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the technology is 
galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an 
evolving world that we understand poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to 
permit the participants in this evolving world to make their own decisions. That 
means three things: make rules clear; create property rights where now there are 
none; and facilitate the formation of bargaining institutions. Then let the world of 
cyberspace evolve as it will, and enjoy the benefits. 
Id. at 215–16. 
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Law of the Horse? How would we know—how do we tell the Law of 
the Horse from the law of anything else? 
Some insight on this can be drawn from the debate that 
surrounded cyberspace law. Judge Easterbrook did not have the last 
word, as lawyers continued to hash out why cyberspace does or does 
not warrant the distinction of a legal field. On the side of describing 
cyberlaw as a distinct field, scholars focused on its “usefulness of joint 
treatment of similar problems.”38 This useful role for a distinct field, 
they argued, derives from the uniqueness of the underlying structure 
of the cyberspace subject matter, the new infrastructure that the 
Internet provides for information markets and other social practices, 
and novel questions of cyberspace governance.39 To generalize their 
argument, new fields of law are likely to emerge when some external 
force—in that case technology—presents profoundly novel subject 
matter, socioeconomic conditions, and governance challenges for law. 
On the other side of the debate came arguments that the 
technological novelty of the Internet served as no more reason to 
craft a new field of law than was, say, the automobile. As one skeptic 
argued, “[v]ery few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic 
technologies. Tort law is not ‘the law of the automobile,’ even though 
the auto accident is the paradigmatic tort case.”40 The newness of the 
Internet, they concluded, thus served as no basis for a distinct field of 
law even if it did lead to novel social practices, as “even new social 
practices are often well served by traditional legal devices.”41 
Reinforcing Judge Easterbrook’s assessment, one scholar summed up 
that 
most legal doctrines are flexible and likely to accommodate new 
social practices in their interstices. Filling interstices may be a form 
of novelty, but can be no more than an interstitial one. Therefore, 
most novel law resembles an extension or amalgamation of familiar 
 
 38. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet 
Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605, 608 (2003). Writing about environmental law, Professor Todd 
Aagaard similarly observed that  
[a] field of law must exhibit some degree of commonality, a characteristic or set of 
characteristics shared in common by the situations that arise within the area of law 
that the field encompasses. Commonalities establish patterns that cohere the 
field. . . . Only when the common characteristics are legally relevant do the materials 
they encompass appear as an identifiable corpus. 
Aagaard, supra note 21, at 242. 
 39. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 38, at 608–10. 
 40. Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (2000). 
 41. Id. at 1148. 
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legal categories. . . . Of course, legal doctrines will change; they 
always do. The new information technologies will trigger some of 
these changes. But with a few exceptions, these changes will exist 
only in the details.42 
Even the most ardent critics of cyberspace law as a field 
conceded, however, that “substantial changes to the legal landscape 
sometimes occur.”43 Sometimes, in other words, the interstices of 
existing fields are simply not of sufficient volume to hold all of the 
novelty that some new agent of change is throwing at the legal 
system—a new field is needed. 
But why try to create a field? The distinction between the Law of 
the Horse and a coherent field of law is more than semantic. Credible, 
legitimate fields of law serve at least three important purposes. First, 
they can provide a forceful political statement. It is no coincidence 
that broad and deeply rooted social movements, such as 
environmentalism in the 1970s and sexual orientation in the 1980s, 
eventually also became associated with distinct fields of law and 
policy. Early advocates in these fields wrote textbooks.44 These not 
only made the case that particular issues, laws, and policies should be 
conceived as discrete fields but paved the way for law school courses 
in these fields, training the next generation of lawyers to think of 
these as credible, legitimate areas of practice.45 Interestingly, 
advocates of Disaster Law are attempting precisely the same thing 
right now. Concerned over inadequate responses to Hurricane 
Katrina and social-justice issues, Professors Dan Farber, Rob 
 
 42. Id. As Professor Aagaard similarly has observed,  
[a]n area of law unified only by factual commonality—that is, a common factual 
characteristic or characteristics that make no difference to the application of the 
law—is, like the Law of the Horse, a joke rather than a legitimate field of legal study 
because the various laws that govern activities related to horses have nothing legally 
important in common. 
Aagaard, supra note 21, at 242 (citation omitted). 
 43. Sommer, supra note 40, at 1148. 
 44. For an early textbook on environmental law, see, for example, FRANK P. GRAD, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: SOURCES AND PROBLEMS (1st ed. 1971). For an early textbook on 
sexual-orientation law, see, for example, LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B. 
Rubenstein ed., 1993). 
 45. Professors Dan Mandelker and Dan Tarlock played this role in environmental law, 
with their pathbreaking casebooks. See EVA H. HANKS, A. DAN TARLOCK & JOHN L. HANKS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1974); DANIEL 
MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT: CASES, TEXT & PROBLEMS (2d ed. 
1971). Professor Bill Rubenstein played a similar role with the publication of his pathbreaking 
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 44, known in subsequent editions as CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW.  
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Verchick, and other scholars have published a casebook and are 
encouraging the teaching of Disaster Law courses.46  
Second, fields can increase efficiency. If highly technical or deep 
knowledge is not widely available to address important crosscutting 
issues, it may make sense to form a new field around that specialized 
knowledge rather than force an existing field to morph itself to 
absorb the topic whole. Hence the ascendance of food-and-drug law 
or telecommunications law. Similarly, because of rising public interest 
or commercial importance, it may be more efficient to think of 
different fields operating under the same umbrella—think of sports 
law and its selective drawing from contracts, torts, insurance, and 
other legal fields.47 Finally, the current legal pastiche may prove to be 
inadequate. The paradigm simply fails to get the job done. This was 
the case for reliance on nuisance doctrines for environmental 
protection and arguably is so for health law’s inadequate reliance on 
tort and contracts.48 
Depending on the circumstances, then, creation of a new field 
can serve political ends by legitimating a social movement, enhance 
efficiency by providing a focal area for technical expertise, ensure 
effectiveness by reorienting laws and policies in a more productive 
structure, or some combination of all three. The main point is that the 
developing a field of law both implies and signifies more than coming 
up with a faddish name. 
 
 46. DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN, 
DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2010); see also Symposium, Disaster Law, 23 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2013). See generally Disaster Law, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/1374.htm (describing the Disaster Law course, blog, and resources 
at the University of California, Berkeley). So, too, have casebooks started appearing on climate 
change law. See generally, e.g., HARI OSOFSKY, WILLIAM C.G. BURNS & LESLEY K. 
MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY (2012); CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER & 
MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW (2009). 
 47. See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GARY R. ROBERTS, ROGER I. ABRAMS & STEPHEN F. 
ROSS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2010) (describing the 
various fields of law implicated in sports-related issues). 
 48. The coherence of health law as a field nonetheless remains in question. See, e.g., Einer 
R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365 
(2006) (noting the disjointed state of the law governing health issues); Mark A. Hall, The 
History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 
354 (2006) (describing health law as a “hodgepodge” composed of four separate and distinct 
branches).  
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B. Stationarity-Based Design in Law and Policy 
One can imagine two distinct trajectories for climate adaptation 
law and policy. 
o A New Field of Climate Change Adaptation. Discrete areas of 
law develop increasingly tight interconnections around climate 
change adaption policies that lead legal doctrines and 
institutions to coalesce into a distinct, coherent field with 
principles all its own. 
o A Law of the Horse. Combinations of different existing fields 
occasionally intersect as needed to work on adaptation solutions, 
forming nothing more coherent than a Law of the Horse.  
Neither course is self-evident circa the vantage of 2013. Just as 
early environmental lawyers did in the 1970s, environmental justice 
advocates did in the 1980s, and cyberspace lawyers did in the 1990s, 
considering these issues for climate change adaptation now is 
important for the simple reason that how climate adaptation law and 
policy are thought of today will influence their design and 
implementation well into the future. In short, better to get it right for 
climate change adaptation at a nascent stage, or at least to think 
carefully about which is the better organizational approach, than to 
have the lawyers of the future look back and wish that a different 
path had been taken. 
Our first step is to assess which path the law, in the face of 
climate change impacts, is likely to follow without intervention. To do 
so, in this Section we develop a general, predictive model for when 
new fields of law coalesce in response to episodes of social, economic, 
technological, or environmental change. 
1. Stationarity in Natural Systems.  Since the dawn of cities, 
communities have needed to manage their water resources. 
Particularly in water-scarce areas, water engineers have faced 
decisions over when and where to build costly infrastructure. This 
need was as true for ancient Rome’s aqueducts as it is for today’s 
desalination plants. In all cases, managers must necessarily assume 
boundaries of natural system variability to make reliable and cost-
effective short-term and long-term decisions. An understanding of 
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how much water supplies vary from year to year is critical to planning 
for dams and reservoirs.49 
Nor is the assumption of boundaries solely true for water 
management. The “dynamic equilibrium” model now firmly in place 
in fields such as ecology is based on the assumption that although 
natural systems vary, the size of the range of variability experienced 
over long time frames in the past will continue relatively unchanged 
into the future.50 Although change in natural systems is inherent, it 
tends to be bounded within predictable confines. There is a reason 
why massive deluges are called a 100-year flood—we can reasonably 
expect such an event every century. 
This “idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging 
envelope of variability” is known in the resource- and infrastructure-
management disciplines as the “stationarity assumption.”51 It assumes 
that change can be managed within a fairly well-defined range of 
extremes. Water-resource managers, for example, have to 
accommodate change in their infrastructure planning as periods of 
drought and heavy precipitation come and go. Human interventions 
in natural systems, such as dams and dikes in the water-management 
context, provide further flexibility to deal with significant changes in 
rainfall. Thus planners “generally have considered natural change and 
variability to be sufficiently small to allow stationarity-based 
design.”52 Without this assumption, which has been well justified by 
the historical record over relevant time frames, planners would not be 
 
 49. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., DAVID H. GETCHES & 
REED D. BENSON, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (6th ed. 2009) (examining the significance of variation in water supply); Milly et al., 
supra note 28 (challenging the continued validity of stationarity as a central assumption of 
water-resource planning).  
 50. Ecologists developing this model place less emphasis on classical conceptions of stasis 
and natural stability. See, e.g., Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New 
Ecology and Some Old Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 56–57 (1996); Reed F. 
Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) (“Among the new paradigms in ecology, none is more 
revolutionary than the idea that nature is not delicately balanced in equilibrium, but rather is 
dynamic, often unpredictable, and perhaps even chaotic.”); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, 
Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 
327–28 (1995) (reviewing JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF 
EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994)).  
 51. Milly et al., supra note 28, at 573. 
 52. Id. 
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able to design, finance, and operate massive, capital-intensive, long-
term projects on major river systems or in large agricultural districts.53 
But the extreme biophysical disruptions of climate change will 
systematically challenge the stationarity assumption across the board. 
As one researcher has bluntly predicted, “stationarity is dead.”54 This 
necessarily means that planning and decision methods incorporating 
stationarity-based resource-management and infrastructure-design 
principles need to be revisited, lest they become “dead” as well.55 In 
2010, for example, the city of Seattle was planning to install a quarter-
billion dollars’ worth of storm drain pipes, meant to serve the city for 
the next seventy-five years.56 Given the realities of climate change, 
however, the city’s planners asked a question that should have been 
easy to answer: What diameter should the pipes be? If the past 
century of rain records are no longer a useful guide for predicting 
storm-runoff loads, could climate models help guide the storm-drain 
design?57 The city’s meteorologist said that he “told them I couldn’t 
give them an answer.”58 
The question for resource and infrastructure managers, 
therefore, is whether climate change will so alter natural systems as to 
render obsolete the assumptions of stationarity-based management 
and design. Many believe that planning going forward must be based 
on a changing climate and greater uncertainty, depending on which 
climate-forcing scenario seems most probable.59 
 
 53. See id. (“Stationarity . . . is a foundational concept that permeates training and practice 
in water-resources engineering.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499, 
1500 (2011) (“Our laws must adapt when they can no longer serve their intended function in 
light of a climate-altered world.”).  
 56. Richard A. Kerr, Vital Details of Global Warming Are Eluding Forecasters, 334 
SCIENCE 173, 173 (2011).  
 57. See Flatt & Tarr, supra note 55, at 1504–05. 
 58. Kerr, supra note 56, at 173; see also Milly et al., supra note 28, at 573–74 (“Systems for 
management of water throughout the developed world have been designed and operated under 
the assumption of stationarity.”); cf. Richard A. Kerr, Time To Adapt to a Warming World, but 
Where’s the Science?, 334 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2011) (discussing the paucity of “actionable 
science” upon which adaptation decisions can be made). 
 59. See Milly et al., supra note 28, at 574 (“Nonstationary hydrologic variables can be 
modeled stochastically to describe the temporal evolution of their [probability density function], 
with estimates of uncertainty. Methods for estimating model parameters can be developed to 
combine historical and paleohydrologic measurements with projections of multiple climate 
models, driven by multiple climate-forcing scenarios.”). 
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The bottom line, however, is that the end of stationarity in 
biophysical systems means the end of business as usual for resource 
management and infrastructure planning. Does it also mean the end 
of business as usual for law? Perhaps so. 
2. The Stationarity Assessment Model for Legal Fields.  Law also 
depends heavily on stationarity-based design. Every field of law is 
embedded in assumptions about variability in natural, social, or 
economic conditions. The development of environmental law, for 
example, has embraced the “dynamic equilibrium” model of 
ecosystems and its assumptions about the relatively stable envelope 
of variability in natural systems.60 But stationarity-based design in law 
is not limited to fields devoted to natural systems. Family law, for 
example, rests upon basic social assumptions such as what constitutes 
a family, the responsibility of the state to protect minors, and the role 
of women in society.61 These assumptions have direct impacts on 
practical policies such as whether to allow same-sex couples to adopt, 
when children should be removed from the home, and the right to 
alimony for divorced women. As society’s views have changed toward 
gay rights and women’s rights so, too, have these new views brought 
fundamental changes in family law.62 
Similarly, climate change will trigger potentially sweeping 
transformations in natural, social, and economic systems. These 
changes, however, will vary across the landscape and will not affect 
law uniformly across all fields. For example, it is difficult to think of 
any stationarity assumptions of family law being significantly 
distorted by climate change. There may be more demand for family 
lawyers in areas hard hit by climate change as families come under 
financial and personal stress, but this hardly presents a need for 
 
 60. E.g., Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863–64, 868 (1994); Wiener, supra 
note 50, at 333–34. 
 61. See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY 
LAW (4th ed. 2010).  
 62. See, e.g., Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell 
Us About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
41, 53–55 (2011) (exploring how the increase in working women has affected societal attitudes 
and by extension alimony payments to women when they divorce); Edward Stein, The 
“Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex 
Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 411–12 (2009) (arguing that changes in societal views 
about marriage and procreation have influenced court decisions regarding marriage and 
adoption for same-sex couples). 
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family law to transform. The foundations of family law are neither 
built directly or indirectly on assumptions about the biophysical 
impacts of sea level or the timing of snowmelt, nor are they built on 
the related social and economic impacts of those biophysical 
phenomena. No surprise, therefore, that climate change adaptation 
has not been a hot topic in family-law scholarship.63 
By contrast, some fields of law rest deeply on assumptions about 
variability in conditions that climate change may affect substantially. 
Environmental law is an obvious example, but it is not alone. 
Consider the age-old common-law rules of littoral-property rights—
how property rights should be allocated when waters move across the 
land—and how those rules account for physical change in the coastal 
environment through doctrines such as accretion and avulsion.64 
These doctrines have developed over a historic period with little 
variability in sea level, storm surges, storm frequency, or storm 
intensity. Those coastal-system attributes fluctuate over time, which is 
the very reason littoral-rights law developed these doctrines, but the 
range within which those attributes fluctuate has not deviated much 
for a very long time. That said, property law has never faced the 
prospect of the sea level rising a foot or more. 
Perhaps sea-level rise will turn out to be of no consequence to 
the law of littoral rights, as lawyers and courts put all the existing 
doctrines to work to adjust for the effects as they arise. Or, perhaps, 
conflicts created by sea-level rise will require changes to the existing 
set of doctrines. Rapid sea-level rise may so distort the envelope of 
variability in coastal conditions that the law of littoral-property rights 
simply will not work anymore and a new system of rules will become 
necessary. Any of these paths of the law seems plausible. No surprise, 
therefore, that climate change has been a hot topic in littoral-
property-law scholarship.65 
 
 63. We have been unable to find legal commentary suggesting any such connections. There 
is no chapter on family law in any text on climate change adaptation. See, e.g., THE LAW OF 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 15.  
 64. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1091, 1109 (2011). 
 65. See generally, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment 
on Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625 (2010); 
Doremus, supra note 64; Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property 
Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51 
(2011); Symposium, Sea Level Rise and Property Rights, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 239 
(2011). 
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Moving from family law and littoral rights to a more theoretical 
level, we argue that this kind of Stationarity Assessment can serve as 
a model framework for evaluating the likelihood of any new legal 
field emerging from significant changes to background natural, social, 
and economic conditions. The assessment involves a three-step 
inquiry: 
o Step 1. What is the envelope of variability for the key natural, 
social, and economic attributes within which a field of law 
operates and on which its assumptions for theory and practice 
are based? 
o Step 2. To what extent will forces of change distort the field’s 
envelope of variability? 
o Step 3. To what extent will the expected new variability regime 
require altering or abandoning the stationarity-based 
components of the field’s theory and practice?   
We readily admit that this is a simple model for a complex 
phenomenon, but its basic questions offer explanatory power. The 
model’s focus ties directly back to the themes underlying the 
cyberspace-law debate outlined in Part I. Agents of change, in that 
case technological, frequently generate novel subject matter, social 
practice, and governance challenges, but usually these new challenges 
fit within the range of variability assumptions on which the relevant 
fields of law are based. The critics of cyberlaw-as-a-field argued this 
very point—that the novelties wrought by the Internet were within 
the comfort zone for “the fields of law tarred with the ‘cyberlaw’ 
brush: commercial law, the problems of multiple sovereignty, and a 
potpourri of privacy, intellectual property, and the First 
Amendment.”66 The interstices of these existing fields, in other words, 
had plenty of capacity to absorb the changes. But when change begins 
to push legal challenges outside of the stationarity-based assumptions 
of relevant existing fields, one should begin to question whether the 
interstitial capacity is truly there. In short, novelty alone does not 
justify the emergence of a new legal field. 
To demonstrate the Stationarity Assessment model’s robustness, 
we apply it to two historical examples of the emergence of distinct 
fields of law—environmental law and environmental justice. We then 
apply the model to climate change adaptation and law in Part II. 
 
 66. Sommer, supra note 40, at 1149–50. 
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3. Testing the Model for Environmental Law and Environmental 
Justice.  Few would suggest today that environmental law is an empty 
construct, a Law of the Horse. Quite the contrary, “in everyday 
discourse, the label ‘environmental law’ signifies a distinct and unique 
area of law.”67 Lawyers identify themselves (and are recognized by 
others) as “environmental lawyers,” and those who lack this title are 
wary of entering the doctrinal thicket. Yet this most certainly was not 
the case five decades ago. 
Prior to the 1970s, environmental problems had been addressed 
almost exclusively through common-law doctrines such as nuisance 
and trespass.68 There were no comprehensive environmental 
protection agencies, and laws directed at air and water pollution 
proved ineffectual.69 More fundamentally, people did not think of air, 
water, and soil pollution as all parts of a larger environmental 
problem. This neglect started to change in the 1960s, partly due to the 
acceptance of ecological thinking through the writings of Barry 
Commoner, Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich, and others who made clear 
to the public the connections between environmental health and our 
well-being.70 Part was due also to the graphic power of seeing the 
earth from space—a fragile orb without borders.71 And part was due 
to forward-thinking lawyers who created strategies to use the law for 
environmental protection. 
As Professor Richard Lazarus has documented, at the earliest 
meetings to discuss legal strategies for environmental protection, the 
participants “deliberately resisted ‘any attempt to define 
environmental law’ and speculated that the best theory ‘might well be 
 
 67. Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
260, 260 (2006). 
 68. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. 
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 63 (6th ed. 2009); see 
also E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory 
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 315–18 (1985) 
(tracing the development of environmental law from common-law to public-regulatory-law 
models). 
 69. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 88–89 (recalling that nineteenth-century state 
and local environmental ordinances “were poorly coordinated and rarely enforced”); Elliott et 
al., supra note 68, at 317 (“For two centuries, the effects of industrial pollution on the natural 
environment had been generally free from regulation by government . . . .”).  
 70. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 90 (discussing examples of events that raised 
public concern about environmental issues).  
 71. See, e.g., Steve Connor, Isn’t That Something, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 10, 2009, at 13 
(“Earthrise, December 1968—the first picture of our world taken from space was published 40 
years ago this week and still retains its haunting power. . . .”).  
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that there is nothing at all unique about environmental law.’”72 To 
paraphrase Judge Easterbrook, they envisioned environmental law as 
a Law of the Horse. As noted before, the term “environmental law” 
did not even exist until 1969.73 
In short order, though, a “[r]evolution in [l]aw” happened in the 
1970s.74 Policymakers, lawyers, activists, and legal scholars 
purposively forged a distinct regime with its own statutes, institutions, 
and guiding principles.75 What is recognized today as the field of 
environmental law would not have materialized as such if these actors 
had instead listed all the issues concerning the environment and 
divvied them up to existing fields of practice and policy. 
How well does the Stationarity Assessment model explain this 
history? The first step is to identify the envelope of variability on 
which the field’s assumptions are based. As noted above, prior to the 
1970s the bulk of pollution control was handled through the common 
law, particularly through nuisance doctrine.76 Nuisance law worked 
well so long as pollution conflicts were local, the causes and effects 
straightforward, and remedies simple to design and administer.77 By 
 
 72. LAZARUS, supra note 22, at 48.  
 73. Id. at 47. 
 74. See id. at 67–97. 
 75. In his sweeping assessment of the origins and coherence of environmental law as a 
field, Professor Tarlock recounts the audacity of the field’s early visionaries:  
What we now call environmental law is very much embedded in the legal landscape. 
The area has developed in an astonishingly short period of time as a result of the rise 
of environmentalism as a political force in the late 1960s. The field was created 
virtually out of whole cloth by a receptive Judiciary and Congress. In the 1960s, 
environmental protection was a marginal political idea. Lawyers followed the great 
common law tradition left open to socially marginal groups and pursued a “rule of 
law litigation” strategy. To discipline public agencies through what we now call 
“public interest” litigation, they had to convince courts that something called 
environmental law existed, when in fact it did not. Creative lawyers used a few 
meager precedents and vague, seldom applied statutes to convince courts that public 
agencies had a duty to consider “environmental” interests and to take steps to avoid 
or mitigate adverse “environmental” impacts. Lawyers skillfully created the fiction 
that the recognition of new environmental protection duties merely required courts to 
perform their traditional and constitutionally legitimate function of applying and 
enforcing, rather than creating, pre-existing rules. 
A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 213, 215–16 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 76. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 77. As one leading property-law casebook observes, for example, “nuisance litigation is ill-
suited to other than small-scale, incidental, localized, scientifically uncomplicated pollution 
problems.” JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. 
SCHILL, PROPERTY 759 (7th ed. 2010); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 75 (“When 
numerous and diverse pollutants emanating from widely dispersed sources affect large 
populations, the common law is a poor vehicle for providing redress . . . .”).  
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the late 1960s, however, it was clear that pollution conflicts had gone 
beyond the assumptions about the envelope of variability for scale 
and complexity. Modern environmental problems were by then 
“typified . . . by continuing and multiple causes, widespread effects 
and multiple victims, and scientifically complex issues as to cause, 
effect, and remedy.”78 
Could nuisance law respond to this expanded envelope of 
variability in scale and complexity—could it effectively manage 
modern pollution problems as a tort? The law might have adapted 
through innovations in class actions, attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs suing 
“in the public interest,” environmental courts, and similar 
incremental changes.79 But the strong sense was that this internal 
adaptive approach would not suffice—a transformation was needed 
that would shift pollution problems from the common law to public 
regulatory law. As Professor Lazarus has described, the “essential 
premise of much environmental law is . . . that the physical 
characteristics of the ecosystem generate spatial and temporal 
spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of natural 
resources far beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common 
law tort rules.”80 
This transition was spelled out in the famous case of Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co.,81 in which New York’s highest court declined to 
enjoin a cement plant’s air emissions found to constitute a nuisance, 
ruling instead that a damages remedy, previously not available under 
New York law, was the more efficient approach.82 Though the case is 
known mostly for its shift in nuisance remedial doctrine (clear 
evidence of the need for adaptation), the court’s rationale for backing 
off injunctive relief sent a loud message to courts and legislatures that 
a transformative approach ultimately would be necessary. As the 
court warned in its timely decision from 1970: 
  It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will 
depend on technical research in great depth; on a carefully balanced 
consideration of the economic impact of close regulation; and of the 
actual effect on public health. It is likely to require massive public 
 
 78. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 77, at 759. 
 79. Id. 
 80. LAZARUS, supra note 22, at 121. 
 81. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 82. Id. at 875. 
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expenditure and to demand more than any local community can 
accomplish and to depend on regional and interstate controls. 
  A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of 
private litigation . . . . This is an area beyond the circumference of 
one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and 
should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute 
between property owners . . . .83 
The date of the opinion, not coincidentally, marks the advent of 
the modern era of environmental law and of the wave of federal 
legislation regulating air, water, and land pollution. The court argued 
that reliance on private nuisance actions would be “grossly 
inadequate for resolving the more typical pollution problems faced by 
modern industrialized societies.”84 Add to this the poor fit between 
nuisance law and the rising tide of environmental values reflected in 
natural-resource management such as endangered species, loss of 
wetlands, biodiversity conservation, and predecision impact 
assessment, and it is no surprise that nuisance law gave way to the 
modern environmental law regime, as the Stationarity Assessment 
model predicts it would. 
We can trace a more recent history through the formation of the 
field of environmental justice. During the explosion of environmental 
laws in the 1970s, the focus had been on reducing aggregate pollution 
levels. Little or no thought was given to the distributional impacts of 
environmental protection.85 This began to change in the early 1980s 
 
 83. Id. at 871. 
 84. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 75. The common law simply could not handle the 
new expanded stationarity regime of the modern pollution problem, “which is why 
environmental law evolved beyond those principles to fill the gap with detailed standards and 
regulatory controls.” LAZARUS, supra note 22, at 134. There is continued debate, however, over 
whether the common law is this ineffective as a mechanism for controlling pollution. For a 
collection of articles debating the point, see generally Symposium, Common Law 
Environmental Protection, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575 (2008). 
 85. As an illustrative example, in 1971 the Sierra Club surveyed its members on their 
interest in having the Club address social-justice issues. “When asked, forty-one percent of the 
members ‘strongly disagreed’ with the statement that the Club should ‘actively involve itself in 
the conservation problems of such special groups as the urban poor and the ethnic minorities.’” 
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and 
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 262 (1997) (quoting the Sierra Club survey); see also Richard 
J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental 
Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 788 (1993) (“Largely ignored in the celebration that 
accompanied the passage of a series of ambitious environmental protection laws during [the 
1970s] were those distinct voices within minority communities that questioned the value of 
environmentalism to their communities.”). 
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with, in particular, high-profile opposition by an African-American 
community in North Carolina to a hazardous waste landfill sited for 
Warren County.86 
A series of studies by the United Church of Christ’s Commission 
for Racial Justice and the U.S. General Accounting Office found 
strong correlations between communities’ racial and economic 
characteristics and their proximity to hazardous-waste landfills.87 
Further studies reached similar conclusions—locally undesirable land 
uses were disproportionately located near minority or low-income 
communities.88 Correlations were ultimately shown for exposure to air 
pollution, lead poisoning, pesticides, occupational hazards, and both 
the stringency and speed of enforcement actions.89 
It is important to recognize that, prior to the late 1980s, the term 
“environmental justice” did not exist. By 1990, though, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had created the 
Environmental Equity Workgroup to examine the distributional 
issues raised by environmental policies and enforcement.90 In 1994, 
the Clinton administration issued an Executive Order directed at 
federal actions and environmental justice.91 Today, considering the 
distributional impacts of environmental protection has become 
commonplace. 
One might conclude from its name that environmental justice is 
an integral component of environmental law. In fact, however, it 
largely operates from the outside—it arose to police environmental 
policy and to ensure the just distribution of benefits and burdens—
 
 86. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & ALEXANDRA B. KLASS, 
THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 2010).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Environmental Justice: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/ environmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 91. Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994 & Supp. V 1998). This order creates an interagency working group from the 
heads of many agencies and departments. Id. § 1-102. They are charged to provide guidance for 
identifying regulations that produce disproportionate impacts on the health or environmental 
quality for minority or low-income populations. Id. §§ 1-102 to -103. Agencies are also charged 
to come up with plans for avoiding such impacts. Id. § 1-103. As with all executive orders, this 
creates no rights enforceable in a court of law. Id. § 6-609. 
 
 
RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:14 PM 
2013]   CLIMATE CHANGE MEETS LAW OF THE HORSE 1001 
and thus has not been assimilated within environmental statutes.92 
Unlike the Clean Air Act93 or Clean Water Act,94 there is no single 
“Environmental Justice Act.” Instead, over time, environmental 
justice has grown into an overarching field of law and policy, 
examining decisions made in many fields including environmental, 
land use, and urban development and expressed in the law through 
executive orders, administrative guidance, and agency licensing and 
permitting procedures.95 
How well does the Stationarity Assessment model explain this 
history? The basic assumption (Step 1) throughout the 1970s’ creation 
of modern environmental law had been that the new statutes either 
had no distributional inequities or were irrelevant. Protests over siting 
decisions and studies of the demographics of locally undesirable land 
uses starting in the 1980s, however, demonstrated that these were 
false assumptions.96 The assumed envelope of variability—that 
environmental law did not need to concern itself with distributional 
impacts—was blown apart (Step 2). In time, it became apparent that a 
new field of environmental justice was necessary (Step 3) because 
environmental law had not been designed to be self-aware or self-
 
 92. As Professors Verchick and Hall explain,  
[A] specific charge to pursue environmental justice is all but nonexistent in the 
nation’s vast armada of federal environmental statutes. It’s not that our 
environmental statutes reject environmental justice, or that they are necessarily 
inconsistent with it (although some have considered the point). Rather, the laws were 
not developed with this priority in mind. 
Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change While Planning for Disaster: 
Footholds, Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2203, 2224–25 (footnotes 
omitted).  
 93. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 94. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 95. For a broad overview of environmental justice law in its present forms, see generally 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAN EJ 2014: LEGAL TOOLS (2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/ej-legal-tools.pdf.  
 96. See UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST JUSTICE & WITNESS MINISTRIES, TOXIC WASTES 
AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.ucc.org/ justice/ 
pdfs/toxic20.pdf (stating that protests objecting to the racially inequitable Warren County waste 
site were the initial catalyst for creating a report on environmental justice); see also LUKE W. 
COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE 
RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 54–55 (2000) (“Since the 1960s, 
researchers have analyzed the distribution of numerous environmental hazards: garbage dumps, 
air pollution, lead poisoning, toxic waste production and disposal, pesticide poisoning, noise 
pollution, occupational hazards, and rat bites. Their overwhelming conclusion is that these 
environmental hazards are inequitably distributed by income or race.”). 
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policing for distributional impacts, nor could it be trusted to do so 
fairly. The field that has emerged is quite different from most 
environmental law—more procedural than substantive, more a 
framework of analytical questions than of command-and-control 
statutory provisions. 
By contrast, consider the more relevant example of ocean-
management policy. At the domestic level, this also operates as a Law 
of the Horse, but everyone recognizes that is suboptimal. In recent 
years, two blue-ribbon commissions on ocean policy have both 
demonstrated that ocean ecosystems are suffering under a 
combination of threats that require more focused legal and policy 
attention.97 Steps 1 and 2 of the Stationarity Assessment model have 
been triggered, but altering or abandoning the current structure for a 
more holistic legal structure has not happened, and likely will not 
happen, because the legal regime has become too entrenched to 
shift.98 
It may prove infeasible to forge a new field of climate adaptation 
law. Mindful of the oceans example, though, it would be unwise not 
to consider at an early point in the development of climate adaptation 
policy how the law should evolve. The remainder of this Article is 
dedicated to this consideration. 
II.  STATIONARITY ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAW 
Although we are the first to propose using the Stationarity 
Assessment model as a method for evaluating the impacts of climate 
change on law, other scholars have already been asking some of the 
same questions that the model incorporates.99 These inquiries have 
ranged from focused studies of fields, such as water law, resource-
conservation law, and human rights law,100 to broader expositions on 
climate change adaptation as an agent of legal change in areas such as 
 
 97. See Studley, supra note 25, at 109–13 (detailing the creation of ocean-policy 
commissions by both the Bush and Obama administrations).  
 98. It is interesting to note that law for horses never progressed beyond Steps 1 and 2. 
Assumptions about horses and their activities have not changed, so the pressures for a new field 
have never coalesced. No one is heard demanding the creation of a distinct field of horse law to 
manage all of the legal issues having to do with horses. Law for horses remains a Law of the 
Horse. 
 99. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 6, at 16–18 (responding to questions regarding whether the 
stationarity model is an accurate and effective assumption in the face of changed conditions 
resulting from climate change and suggesting what an alternative model should look like). 
 100. See supra note 6. 
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federalism.101 These studies also have produced a range of 
conclusions, from predictions that different fields of law can evolve to 
accommodate climate change impacts,102 to concerns that the 
distortion of stationarity assumptions will be so profound as to 
demand revolutionary changes across crosscutting swaths of law.103 To 
evaluate those conclusions, we present a case study of climate change 
adaptation in a coastal region. We then step back to assess what this 
suggests for the development and organization of climate change law 
and policy. 
A. Stationarity Assessment Case Study 
The biophysical effects of increasing atmospheric greenhouse-gas 
concentrations will be uneven around the globe and within the United 
States.104 The principal impacts and their core set of environmental 
consequences are well understood—rising mean surface temperature, 
ocean acidification and warming, rising sea level, and changes in 
precipitation patterns.105 Many biophysical consequences of these 
primary drivers are also well understood, such as changes in the 
variability and intensity of storm events, migration of species to adjust 
to changed conditions, changes in flood and drought patterns, and 
shifts in ecosystem regimes.106 Nonetheless, the socioeconomic 
impacts of climate change and the adaptation responses needed to 
manage them are difficult to anticipate at local scales. Climate change 
researchers have constructed rough scenarios for many regions, 
however, and cities and states are beginning to develop adaptation-
planning processes.107 Synthesizing from that body of work, we 
 
 101. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 6, at 391–432. 
 102. See J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 
73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012) (exploring likely evolutions in property law in response to sea-level 
rise); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-
Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 59–62 (2008) (suggesting several ways that the existing 
endangered-species regime can meet its goals in the face of climate change). 
 103. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 104. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; U.S. 
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2.  
 105. Cf. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 17–40 (explaining 
various phenomena associated with climate change and their predicted environmental impacts).  
 106. Cf. id. at 41–106 (explaining some of the effects of climate change on ecosystems). 
 107. See Vicki Arroyo & Terri Cruce, State and Local Adaptation, in THE LAW OF 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 15, at 
569 (stating that state and local leaders are taking action to adapt to changing climatic 
conditions based on regional predictions of climate change effects).  
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develop a plausible local climate change scenario here to apply the 
Stationarity Assessment model in a dynamic legal adaptation context. 
Drawing from a number of assessments of climate change 
impacts,108 our case study focuses on a hypothetical coastal city in the 
United States and its adjoining rural areas. The region enjoys a classic 
four-season climate and all of the recreational activities such a climate 
makes possible. The city has a thriving harbor area and busy 
waterfront business and entertainment districts. Local surface 
reservoirs and groundwater aquifers provide ample water for 
residential and commercial uses. Not far from the city along the coast 
is a large wildlife-refuge area rich in coastal estuarine wetlands and an 
abundance of waterfowl. A significant fishery industry operates just 
offshore. Inland of the city one finds a large agricultural district. The 
farms raise a variety of crops and livestock and have ample water 
supply from natural precipitation combined with water withdrawals 
from rivers augmented by snowmelt runoff from a nearby mountain 
region. Abundant public parks provide recreational opportunities. In 
general, life is good in this corner of the world. 
What will happen to our idyllic coastal region as climate change 
continues on its present course? Assume that in this region surface 
temperatures continue rising, the sea level continues rising, and 
overall precipitation levels fall but intense precipitation events 
become more common. To put pressure on the legal system for 
purposes of our Stationarity Assessment, a plausible worst-case 
scenario of biophysical and socioeconomic changes and likely 
adaptive responses can be constructed around the region’s various 
sectors. 
Urban: The central city, focused on its harbor economy and 
thriving commercial districts, faces the dire threats of rising sea levels 
and more frequent and intense storm events. These effects will 
threaten the integrity of the waterfront infrastructure and buildings 
and pose increased flooding risks to the central city as a whole. Rising 
 
 108. We have synthesized our case study from analyses provided in several leading national 
and state impact-assessment and adaptation-planning studies. See generally CAL. NATURAL 
RES. AGENCY, supra note 5; GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., FINAL 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2008), available at http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/GBLWRM/docs/CCIGReport08Web.pdf; 
MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION REPORT (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/cca/eea-
climate-adaptation-report.pdf; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2. Our 
goal is not to document a particular climate change outcome, but rather to construct a plausible 
regional scenario from which to assess legal adaptation. 
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temperatures will lead to increased demand for cooling of buildings 
and cars in warm seasons, though heating demand will fall in cooler 
seasons. More frequent heat waves will threaten sensitive 
populations, though fewer intense cold snaps will alleviate a different 
source of health concerns. Increased temperatures could also allow 
introduction of disease-bearing insects and other vectors. Reduced 
overall precipitation will decrease reservoir supplies, and sea-level 
rise will pose the risk of saltwater intrusion to water supply aquifers. 
Depending on relative conditions in other urban areas, climate-
induced human migration may lead to substantial positive or negative 
population shifts. 
Possible adaptive responses to these changed conditions include 
a wide range of approaches. Sea-level rise and storm-surge events 
could be combated through the construction of seawalls and other 
water-barrier structures, or the waterfront infrastructure could be 
abandoned and replaced further inland in protected areas. Rising 
energy demands in warm seasons likely will lead to efforts to increase 
peak energy capacity as well as to develop new production 
technologies and conservation methods. Health concerns associated 
with heat and disease will require increased public-health capacities. 
Decreasing water supplies will demand more effective water-
conservation methods and put pressure on local authorities to locate 
new sources of water. 
Agricultural: Warming temperatures will increase the length of 
growing seasons, but may also introduce new agricultural crop pests, 
weeds, and livestock diseases. Some crops and livestock will not 
tolerate the new temperature regime, but farmers may be able to 
replace them with other suitable varieties. Rising temperatures will 
also reduce precipitation in the mountain region and cause earlier 
snowmelt events, thus altering the availability of irrigation water from 
the region’s rivers. Reduced overall precipitation also will strain 
water availability, threatening the viability of some crops and 
livestock. Increased frequency and intensity of storm events will lead 
to increases in crop damage and soil erosion. 
Farmers will adapt to these changes by switching to different 
crop varieties and, with more difficulty, different livestock. Improved 
farming methods could enhance water-use efficiency and protect 
crops from storm events. New crops, pests, and weeds may prompt 
farmers to use different fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides. As 
with urban water users, decreased agricultural water supplies also will 
put pressure on farmers to secure new supplies. 
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Coastal and Marine: Rising sea levels will erode shorelines and 
inundate existing coastal wetlands, though in some places existing 
upland areas will transition into new wetland regimes. Increased 
frequency and intensity of storm events will further damage coastal 
wetlands and pose flooding risks to coastal properties. Rising ocean 
temperatures will affect the viability of valuable fishery species and 
allow for the introduction of invasive species and disease-bearing 
species. Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations will acidify marine 
ecosystems, threatening the integrity of coral reef systems that 
provide storm surge protection to coastal lands. Earlier snowmelt 
events and more frequent and intense storm events will alter the flow 
pattern of nutrients from inland regions to the marine environment. 
Although some of the adaptive responses for rural coastal lands 
will be similar to those available to the urban area, resources may be 
more limited, and thus options such as seawalls and offshore barriers 
may be less viable. The fishery industry will have little power over 
changes to the local marine species assembly, and thus will be forced 
to switch catch targets, to move to other fishing grounds, or to shut 
down. 
Recreation: Rising temperatures will reduce cold-weather 
recreation opportunities while increasing the length of the warm-
weather recreation season. Increased frequency of heat waves and 
storm events, however, will limit warm weather recreation days. 
Decreased overall precipitation will limit water-related recreation 
such as freshwater boating and skiing in the mountains. Increased 
water temperatures could reduce some freshwater recreational 
opportunities, such as fishing for a particular species no longer able to 
survive in local lakes and rivers. Rising sea levels will inundate the 
wildlife refuge wetlands, thus reducing waterfowl populations and any 
hunting opportunities associated with them. 
Although economically disruptive, recreational providers should 
be able to transition to take advantage of the increased warm-season 
opportunities while phasing down in the cold season. Ski areas may 
no longer be viable in the mountain region, but the warm-weather-
recreation industry in the mountains and along the coast may be 
significantly enhanced. The hunting and fishing industries will also 
need to adjust to new species and habitat regimes. Public recreation 
areas such as the refuge and parks may need to alter infrastructure 
and staffing to adjust as well. Overall, however, while recreational 
opportunities will change, they will remain abundant and varied. 
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Ecosystems: Many species with life patterns keyed to particular 
temperature, precipitation, and habitat regimes may find the region’s 
new set of conditions unsuitable. Some of those species will migrate, 
while those unable to migrate will face increasing stress. Other 
species more suited to the new set of conditions will thrive, however, 
and some species not previously found in the region will migrate to it. 
Increasing temperatures and decreasing precipitation will combine to 
cause more fire events. At a more fundamental level, basic ecosystem 
processes such as nutrient cycling and decomposition will be altered. 
Some ecosystems, faced with all of these threats, will transition into 
entirely different regimes supporting significantly altered species 
assemblies and providing altered streams of ecosystem services to 
human populations. 
Ecosystem-resource managers will have difficulty adapting to 
these effects if their goal is to maintain a prescribed set of ecosystem 
conditions, as may be the case for the wildlife refuge or a wilderness 
area. It would be futile, for example, to attempt to halt the out-
migration of species, and it would be a resource-intensive challenge to 
attempt to barricade ecosystems against in-migration. Even more 
challenging would be efforts to keep basic ecosystem processes 
unchanged. Preservation, in other words, will become an increasingly 
unattainable management goal, meaning that adaptive responses 
must focus on transition goals such as maintaining overall biodiversity 
or overall ecosystem service benefits. 
This collection of scenarios is, admittedly, rather grim. But it is 
based on entirely plausible assumptions about climate change and its 
worst biophysical and socioeconomic impacts. To be sure, many other 
sets of plausible assumptions exist with less dire consequences,109 but 
our intention is to explore the strongest possible case for 
transformative legal change. 
B. Assessment of Legal Fields 
Climate change adaptation inevitably will demand the services of 
law and legal institutions, but that does not necessarily lead to the 
demand for changes in the law. The Stationarity Assessment model 
identifies one potential source of demand for legal transformation—
significant disruption of the law’s assumptions about physical, social, 
and economic conditions. Professor Holly Doremus, for example, has 
 
 109. See J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
206, 217–41 (2012) (reviewing the range of climate change harms and benefits). 
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suggested that because “[c]limate change will unsettle expectations 
about both land and water,” it follows that “[c]hanges to underlying 
property rights will be needed.”110 
As we described in the Introduction, the demands of climate 
change adaptation will implicate different fields of law differently. 
Family law jumps out as a legal field that appears to be relatively 
untouched by climate change. We have not rigged our case study to 
work family law out of the picture. One would have to contrive a far-
fetched story to identify novel legal issues that climate change could 
present for family law—indeed, we cannot think of one and have 
found no evidence anyone else has. But family law is not alone in this 
respect. Other fields of law similarly untouched include criminal law, 
commercial transactions, consumer law, products liability law, tax 
law, banking and finance law, constitutional law, administrative law, 
telecommunications law, and food and drug law, to name just a few. 
Take any of these fields and work it through the Stationarity 
Assessment model. We will use criminal law as an example. It is 
difficult to articulate any assumption that criminal law makes about 
the variability of natural, social, or economic conditions that will be 
disrupted in any substantial sense by climate change. Perhaps certain 
kinds of crime, such as looting, are associated with natural events 
such as hurricanes and floods. Yet how criminal law manages such 
crimes is in no sense based on assumptions about the range of 
variability of hurricanes and floods. To the extent that any 
adjustments are needed by the legal system to respond to novel 
crimes associated with the effects of climate change, criminal law will 
adapt to manage them. 
To be sure, climate change adaptation will be a medium within 
which legal issues in criminal law and many other fields arise—one 
can envision crimes involving bid-rigging for sea-wall construction, 
intellectual property issues involving patents for new weatherproofing 
technologies, and products liability issues involving climate 
adaptation products. But those circumstances present no pressure for 
the law to adapt any more than do bid-rigging for subway 
construction, a patent for a new electronic device, or an injury from a 
defective kitchen product. They are simply new fact patterns to plug 
into the existing legal doctrine and practice. In all such cases the 
Stationarity Assessment comes up negative—to the extent these fields 
 
 110. Doremus, supra note 64, at 1091. 
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of law make any assumptions about the range of variability for 
conditions likely to be affected by climate change, novel legal issues 
arising from climate change will fit within their interstices. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are fields such as water law 
that are likely to confront sets of conditions with no, or at best weak, 
analogs in existing doctrine and practice. Water-law scholars, for 
example, have argued that their field faces tremendous pressure to 
change in response to climate change, and our case study offers no 
reason to doubt them.111 The changes in precipitation patterns and the 
availability of the right quality and quantity of water could thrust the 
agricultural and urban populations into a water competition like none 
they have experienced. Indeed, the region as a whole may find itself 
competing with other regions for new supplies and negotiating with 
yet other regions—regions suddenly in water abundance—for water 
transfers. 
What makes family law and water law so different in this 
respect? We believe the answer lies in their respective stationarity 
assumptions. Water law is, at bottom, about water scarcity, and the 
natural-water system is in store for a tremendous amount of change. 
Family law, by contrast, is not about a biophysical system. Nor are the 
other fields in the long list suggested previously. The legal fields most 
exposed to adaptive pressures from climate change, in other words, 
 
 111. A growing number of water-law scholars have argued that climate change adaptation 
will demand fundamental reforms of domestic water-allocation law and water-property rights. 
See generally, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Change 
Adaptation: U.S. Water, Drought, and Agricultural Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 201 (2012) (examining 
the complex tradeoffs between compensation, risk allocation, and risk reduction as adaptation 
strategies for agricultural regions where more severe drought regimes are expected); Adell 
Amos, Freshwater Conservation in the Context of Energy and Climate Policy: Assessing Progress 
and Identifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western United States, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. 
REV. 1 (2008); John T. Andrews, Jessica Roberts Pearson & John K. Woodling, California 
Water Management: Subject to Change, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1463 (2008); 
Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing Climate Change as 
Emergency Response and Preparedness, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 709 (2010); Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383 
(2008); Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water Management 
in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55 (2007); Brian E. Gray, Global Climate 
Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management Opportunities, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1453 (2008); Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Robert H. Abrams, Climate 
Change and Freshwater Resources, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 30; Kathleen A. 
Miller, Climate Change and Water in the West: Complexities, Uncertainties and Strategies for 
Adaptation, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 87 (2007); A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law 
Reform in West Virginia: The Broader Context, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 495 (2004).  
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are those resting deeply on stationarity assumptions about biophysical 
systems. In addition to environmental law and water law, land use 
law, agricultural law, insurance law, and littoral-property rights easily 
come to mind as fields heavily dependent on assumptions about how 
the biophysical world works and, most critically, about its envelopes 
of variability. Rock that world and you could rock those fields of law. 
Consider, for example, ways in which each of the following fields 
could be significantly disrupted in our coastal region case study: 
o Environmental Law. Ecological change could render 
meaningless habitat protections for species and management 
goals for wildlife refuges. 
o Water Law. Extreme shifts in water supplies could undermine 
long-standing prior appropriation water law doctrines. 
o Land Use Law. Sea-level rise could lead to demands for intense 
restriction of coastal development and for shifting development 
priorities to rural inland areas. 
o Agricultural Law. Farms may demand greater flexibility in their 
use of chemicals through changes to pesticide laws. 
o Insurance Law. Questions may arise about coverage of damages 
from climate related events and the adequacy of insureds’ 
adaptive measures. 
o Littoral-Property Rights. Sea-level rise may present difficult legal 
issues about the public-private ownership divide along the coast. 
Of course, change is an inherent factor in all of these fields: 
humans have altered ecosystems through agriculture for millennia, 
droughts and floods affect water supplies, development patterns shift 
with changes in technology, new pests arrive in agricultural districts, 
contaminated soil presents new issues for insurance law, and 
coastlines have long shifted around. But climate change is different, 
very different, in both the quantity and quality of change likely to be 
introduced into biophysical systems. Hurricanes hit the coast, and 
tides shift where the beach ends, but an extra foot of sea level and ten 
more hurricanes a year could put a coastal system well outside its 
historic range of variability. 
What does that mean for fields intimately connected with 
biophysical conditions? It is tempting to move quickly to the 
conclusion that such fields necessarily will have to adapt to the 
changes in natural systems, but the Stationarity Assessment model 
RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:14 PM 
2013]   CLIMATE CHANGE MEETS LAW OF THE HORSE 1011 
demands a more deliberate analysis. It is not enough to observe that 
nature will change; one also has to evaluate how much variability in 
nature these fields of law are designed to tolerate. Given the natural 
range of variability even without climate change, fields like 
environmental law are accustomed to dramatic swings of doctrinal 
and institutional change. 
Indeed, the history of environmental law is largely one of 
continuous change to adapt to changes in its physical and social 
contexts. For example, by the mid-1990s—just two decades into the 
life of modern environmental law—lawyers broadly discussed the 
development of “second generation” approaches to manage the 
widening and ever-changing array of environmental problems.112 
Similarly, change in water law, even radical change, is nothing new. 
The classic laws of appropriative rights in the West and of riparian 
rights in the East have undergone significant evolution in many states 
over time to reflect social and economic change.113 Yet with all of 
these changes, environmental law is still environmental law, and 
water law is still water law. 
Let us dig deeper into environmental law to drive this point 
home. What is it about climate change that is going to throw 
environmental law something it has never seen, something completely 
outside the box, something it just cannot handle? We think the 
answer is, nothing. To be sure, climate change will change the 
environment in many ways: sea-level rise will inundate coastal 
wetlands and erode beaches, fire regimes will change, some areas will 
have more water and some less, species will migrate, people will 
migrate, it will grow warmer everywhere. But so what? In particular, 
so what for environmental law? Environmental law has been 
operating for decades in all of those contexts. It is not as if the loss of 
 
 112. By the mid-1990s “virtually everyone . . . agree[d] that our historical command-and-
control approach [was] inefficient and inadequate by itself to carry us where we still need to 
go.” Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword, The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. viii, viii (1996). For the leading contemporaneous accounts of the emergence of the 
second generation alternatives, see generally Dennis Hirsch, Second Generation Policy and the 
New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003); and Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation 
of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).  
 113. See generally Joseph Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 
106 W. VA. L. REV. 539 (2004); Joseph Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the 
Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 9 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 769 (2002).  
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wetlands, erosion of beaches, fire or its absence, wet or dry areas, 
invasive species, people moving around, and it being hot outside are 
anything new to environmental law. It is more likely that peoples’ 
priorities may change and environmental law’s position at the table of 
policymaking may grow more or less important,114 but it will still be 
environmental law. Consider how each of the six fields of law 
mentioned above could adapt to biophysical change and still retain its 
basic form and substance: 
o Environmental law. Conservation areas can adopt new, more 
fluid management goals, such as managing for overall 
biodiversity rather than for specific biomes or species. 
o Water law. The doctrine can incorporate specialized rules for 
extreme periods of drought and for accommodating innovations 
such as water markets. 
o Land use law. State and local authorities can adopt specialized 
rules for areas threatened most by sea-level rise and embed them 
within existing zoning- and growth-management regimes. 
o Agricultural law. With assistance from and monitoring by federal 
and state agencies, farms in climate-transition zones can 
carefully shift to new practices. 
o Insurance law. Coverage issues can be worked out through 
gradual industry refinements to and judicial interpretations of 
coverage policies. 
o Littoral-property rights. State courts and legislatures can adopt 
specialized rules of littoral property that resolve sea-level-rise 
issues while fitting within the broader existing regime of littoral 
rights. 
With or without climate change, in other words, fields like these 
are inherently dynamic, and all indications are that change remains in 
their future. This is not to say that change comes easily to these fields. 
Often it is tumultuous and controversial. But change does come 
naturally to them—they are designed to change. They transform, but 
they do not crumble. 
 
 114. See Ruhl, supra note 6 (examining how public demand for adaptation measures such as 
water supply and protection from more intense storm, drought, and fire events could diminish 
the priority for environmental protection). 
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C. Calling a Horse a Horse 
Put simply, when one steps back and applies the Stationarity 
Assessment model to evaluate likely implications of climate change 
adaptation to the full span of legal fields, it is difficult to identify more 
than a few that will face pressure to change. The legal response to 
climate change adaptation will be evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary for the vast majority of legal fields. Most of law and 
legal institutions will see climate change adaptation as just another set 
of challenging issues to work through the system, and it will be easy 
work at that. 
The short list of fields mentioned above, all sharing the common 
trait of resting deeply on assumptions about the stationarity of 
biophysical system variability, will have to work harder, maybe much 
harder, to adapt, and one or two might buckle under the pressure and 
go through transformational change. But this is far from certain. 
After all, land use law has imposed sharp restrictions on development 
in many other contexts, such as restrictions against (or mandating) 
the use or density of buildings in certain areas to serve a broad variety 
of public purposes.115 Climate change adaptation would just be a new 
purpose. And environmental law has already begun adapting through 
specialized doctrines. Thus the Endangered Species Act116 has 
addressed species threatened by climate change (for example, the 
polar bear) and appears capable of responding to climate impacts 
without need of sweeping doctrinal change.117 There is no reason to 
assume the core legal doctrines and practices of either of these fields 
or the others mentioned above will require sweeping transformation 
as the impacts of climate change become more severe. 
Overall, therefore, a field-specific assessment of climate impacts 
suggests that climate change adaptation may well follow the path of 
the Law of the Horse. Specific fields will adapt on their own as 
challenges arise, with no need for a new field. Calling it climate 
adaptation law might make it suitable for a “law and” seminar in law 
schools or conference for practitioners, but not as a distinctly 
coherent operating field of law. Although this might be the most 
probable trajectory, however, it is not at all clear this would be the 
most desirable course of development. In Parts III and IV of this 
 
 115. See DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 69–133 (5th ed. 2008).  
 116. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 117. See supra note 102.  
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Article, therefore, we evaluate the possibility and the potential 
contours of forging a distinct field of climate adaptation law. 
III.  JUSTIFYING AN INTERVENTION 
The preceding analysis suggests that the disruptive effects of 
adapting to climate change are unlikely to undermine the doctrinal 
substance and institutional architecture of most legal fields. The 
possible exceptions include those fields that depend heavily on 
biophysical assumptions, and even for them it is not clear that 
fundamental transformations will be necessary. The implication is 
that a new field of climate adaptation law and policy is unlikely to 
evolve incrementally on its own. 
Though an important finding, it does not end the analysis. The 
question remains whether there is merit in trying purposively to 
create a field, of intervening to alter the likely default trajectory 
toward a Law of the Horse. It is well worth recalling that 
environmental law faced a similar crossroads in its early days. A Law-
of-the-Horse approach was entirely possible, but it was rejected in 
favor of creating a new field that ultimately boasted its own statutes, 
agencies, and core principles such as internalizing externalities, risk 
management, and public involvement. 
In retrospect, this was both outrageously ambitious and, by many 
measures, outrageously effective. Does it make sense to emulate this 
ambition and purposively intervene to create a distinct field for 
climate change adaptation? Motivated by that question, in Parts III 
and IV we explore what would justify and comprise a distinct law of 
climate change adaptation. The first step is to examine what a Law-
of-the-Horse approach risks missing and what is really at stake in 
climate adaptation policy. 
A. Changing the Scale of Stationarity Assessment 
If, as we conclude, the Law of the Horse appears to be the 
natural path for law in response to climate change, what would justify 
an intervention to change that path? After all, we concluded in Part II 
that the vast majority of legal fields come through the Stationarity 
Assessment basically unscathed, and the few that will take some hits 
are likely to remain standing. Why is anything more needed? The 
answer lies in the scale at which the Stationarity Assessment is 
applied. 
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Looking at climate change adaptation through the eyes of a 
single field of law allows careful analysis of the envelope of variability 
within which the field operates and on which its assumptions are 
based. Predicting the extent to which climate change will alter that 
envelope then allows one to consider how effectively the field’s 
stationarity-based designs of the past will work in the climate change 
future. Focusing on one field of law thus identifies how assumptions 
of stationarity may break down for that field and allows for 
comparisons between fields to assess which are likely to undergo 
greater pressure to adapt or, at the extreme, to snap. 
The disadvantage of the field-specific approach, however, is its 
failure to capture the cumulative effect of numerous intersecting fields 
undergoing stress on their respective stationarity-based foundations. 
It is one thing to observe that a field of law has managed change in 
the past and that climate change merely provides for similar 
evolution, albeit possibly at more frequent intervals or intense 
magnitudes. From this perspective, climate change adaptation may 
only require the field to work harder, with tinkering here and there. 
In settings relevant to climate change adaptation, such as 
agriculture or coastal land use, the field-specific approach may 
suggest that each field comes through the Stationarity Assessment 
reasonably intact. But there is a further level of analysis needed. The 
aggregate effect of each field feeling moderate stress from climate 
change could lead to undetected cracks in the stationarity-based 
foundation of the system of fields working together. The most 
challenging climate adaptation questions are likely to be derived from 
complex environmental, social, and economic conditions that 
intersect across numerous fields. Viewed this way, climate change 
adaptation may demand more crosscutting responses from law than 
the field-specific focus led us to conclude. 
It may not be, in other words, that climate adaptation law 
develops to replace any particular field but, rather, emerges to 
manage how those fields interact at scales relevant to climate 
adaptation decisionmaking. Decisions in these contexts will demand 
difficult policy tradeoffs and trigger different sets of questions 
depending on which way policy moves. 
Consider, for example, the problem of domestic migration as 
people facing water scarcity, intense storms, and heat waves search 
for more hospitable environs. Widely regarded as a “complex 
challenge” of the climate change future, such migration waves will 
implicate “eight basic risks: loss of land, employment, shelter, and 
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access to common resources; economic marginalization; increased 
morbidity and mortality; food insecurity; and negative cultural and 
psychological impacts.”118 On a more local scale, consider this 
description of the hard choices that San Francisco, much like our case 
study’s hypothetical coastal city, will confront as it begins to plan for 
sea-level rise: 
[How to adapt to sea-level rise] presents enormously complex policy 
and economic issues both for existing communities and new 
development. There are several strategies for responding [to] sea 
level rise, ranging from protection (raising or building levees), to 
building “resilient” structures, to precluding new development in 
flood-prone areas, to abandoning existing built-up areas and 
retreating from the rising waters. The favored approach depends not 
only on the specific circumstances, but also on one’s point of view 
regarding which values to protect.119 
The choices among these options will have profound implications 
for and will lean heavily on land use controls, housing policy, public- 
and private-insurance providers, public-health services, coastal-
ecosystem protection, emergency response, and public-infrastructure 
design and finance. Although it may be comforting to think that each 
of these legal fields can handle its piece of the policy dynamic, is there 
cause for concern that not all of the policy questions have been 
adequately addressed? We believe there is. 
Of course, many coastal cities have had to deal on a regular basis 
with the realities of the coastal environment, including whether to 
promote or restrict coastal barriers and how much to regulate coastal 
development. But few cities have had to wrestle with whether they 
should finance and construct an enormous seawall system the length 
of the city’s coastline, or retrofit all buildings and infrastructure to 
have greater resilience to floods, or just pack it up and move the 
entire city inland. Some of the legal fields working on the problem, 
for example, may experience much stronger interactions, such as the 
potential for land use decisions (moving inland) to put constraints on 
water-management decisions (how to get the water supply inland) 
and public-safety and health-services policy (how to serve the 
population that does not move inland). There may also be gaps in the 
 
 118. A. de Sherbinin et al., Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change, 334 
SCIENCE 456, 457 (2011).  
 119. Zane Gresham & Miles Imwalle, Sea Level Rise: Regulatory Responses in San 
Francisco Bay and Across the Globe, TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 10, 10. 
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law that are exposed by new policy questions, such as what to do if 
large numbers of people from other regions move into the area. 
Which field handles mass domestic migration? Certainly not 
immigration law. 
Professors Verchick and Hall, in their work on flood- and storm-
adaptation policy, have explained how this problem already is 
clogging up development of adaptation policy at the federal level: 
  The cross-sector nature of adaptation makes things even worse. 
With so many government sectors having some relationship to 
climate resilience, it is unlikely that any single sector-based agency 
will “own” the issue. And that is why only a few sector-based 
agencies . . . think very much about adaptation at all: it’s someone 
else’s problem. Thus few agencies have developed specialized 
regulations or guidelines to promote climate resilience. Nor has 
Congress broadly directed agencies to focus on adaptation or 
created specific authorities for them to do so.120 
Hence, although it may appear that most fields of law look to be 
in good shape when subjected to the Stationarity Assessment test, 
relying exclusively on field-specific assessments may lead to 
unwarranted complacency. So what is to be done? 
B. Adaptation as Process, Not Substance 
Consider the two basic approaches one could take to designing a 
field of climate change adaptation, one substantive and one 
procedural. Environmental law can provide a useful example of the 
formation of a substantive field. As described above, environmental 
law largely supplanted nuisance law as the primary regime for 
pollution problems when it became clear that the latter had simply 
been outstripped by changes in the nature of pollution.121 Nuisance 
law just was not up to the task. In its place, media-specific laws were 
adopted with national, uniform standards that would be implemented 
and enforced by a new environmental agency.122 Why not follow the 
same approach with climate change adaptation? 
Developing a substantive body of law and policy for climate 
change adaptation may seem to be an attractive strategy at first 
glance. It certainly is easy to imagine climate change mitigation, 
 
 120. Verchick & Hall, supra note 92, at 2223 (citation omitted). 
 121. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 122. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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which is guided by simple objectives for pollution control (reducing 
greenhouse-gas emissions) and land use (preventing deforestation 
and increasing vegetative capacity to sequester carbon). But it is far 
less obvious how climate change adaptation translates into a 
substantive field of prescriptions and standards. Climate change 
adaptation is too crosscutting. Climate change will affect everywhere 
one way or another, but it will affect different areas in vastly different 
ways. What constitutes successful climate change adaptation will 
necessarily be different across the landscape.123 Some areas will be 
fighting increased flooding while others fight increased drought. 
Moreover, adaptation measures will frequently have vertical and 
horizontal transboundary effects. One state adapting to longer 
growing seasons with increased irrigation could divert water supplies 
from another state facing reduced precipitation, and national water-
infrastructure policy could conflict with either or both states’ 
adaptation goals.124 It is hard to imagine what a substantive climate 
adaptation law would even look like. 
Consider also the institutional structure of emerging substantive 
fields of law. There is little doubt that the birth of the EPA helped to 
legitimize the environmental movement as a recognized field of law. 
A climate adaptation agency would face similar challenges 
implementing substantive laws. Given the vast breadth of sectors and 
activities implicated by climate change adaptation in so many 
different ways, it is hard to know what a regulatory body could 
meaningfully accomplish. In brief, attempting to construct a 
substantive law that could effectively and meaningfully address the 
myriad aspects of climate change adaptation seems a fool’s errand. 
By contrast, however, for the very reasons a substantive field 
would be too unwieldy to manage, a procedural strategy for climate 
change adaptation is far easier to envision. Once one considers 
systemic decisions that San Francisco and other regions will face—
whether to construct a system of seawalls, to supply or not supply 
water to parched areas, or how to move a city inland—the shape of 
adaptation law and policy becomes much clearer. At those decision 
scales, climate change adaptation is a process. As a process, 
moreover, climate change adaptation intersects across many 
 
 123. See McDonald, supra note 18, at 288 (“[T]he highly localized nature of climate impacts 
also means that adaptation responses must also be tailored to local conditions . . . .”). 
 124. John H. Davidson, Adapting to Climate Change: Transbasin Water Diversions and an 
Example from the Missouri River Valley, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 757 (2010). 
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substantive fields. Each discrete substantive issue—how high to build 
a seawall or how much water to divert to parched farms—is likely to 
match up well with some existing field of law. But none of the existing 
fields of law alone or in any combination are well equipped to 
manage the emergent process dimensions of climate change 
adaptation. 
To make this clearer, consider the example of environmental 
justice. The need for a field of environmental justice arose precisely 
because substantive environmental law was operating as expected. 
The problem was that implementation of individual laws, when taken 
together, created an unintended problem. There was a systematic bias 
at work, as environmental harms and inadequate implementation 
routinely fell on poor communities of color.125 This was an emergent 
property that would not have been readily apparent in examining 
substantive air, water, or hazardous waste laws. It was only in 
assessing the process of their combined application that this problem 
and its scope became evident. Environmental justice thus focused in 
large part on identifying and correcting these systemic harms.126 
In the same way, it may very well be that no existing field of law 
is rendered obsolete by climate change, but that more than a Law of 
the Horse is needed—that is, a distinct field of climate adaptation 
theory and practice is nonetheless necessary and appropriate to 
manage policy goals that no individual field can address. This need 
arises because the emergent harms from adapting to climate change 
are more likely to result from intersecting decisionmaking processes 
than from substantive legal doctrines. In simple terms, the difficult 
challenges will primarily be at the system level and will invoke the 
need for a new procedural field far more than a new substantive field. 
IV.  DESIGNING A FIELD OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
If climate adaptation policy is about process, it follows that 
climate adaptation law should be about process. In this Part we 
outline the policy goals and implementation mechanisms for a 
process-oriented field of climate change adaptation. Although 
perhaps not a field of law in the traditional sense of a substantive 
body of doctrine, like environmental justice, the new regime we 
propose is a procedural overlay—spanning multiple substantive fields 
 
 125. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 126. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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to enforce overarching policy goals unlikely to be satisfied sufficiently 
were each substantive field left to enforce them independently. In this 
Part we outline the goals and mechanisms of such a procedural 
overlay for climate adaptation law. 
A. Policy Goals 
A procedural approach seems to make sense for climate change 
adaptation, but with what policy goals in mind? We argue that climate 
adaptation law is well suited for implementing three overarching 
normative goals lying at the heart of the emerging adaptation policy 
dialogue. The first two are reducing vulnerability and increasing 
resilience to climate change.127 These are related.128 
Reducing vulnerability seeks to prevent climate change harms. 
This can be achieved by improving the reliability of infrastructure and 
other mechanisms designed to shield human communities and 
ecosystems from the harmful effects of climate change, such as by 
constructing sea walls to protect coastal areas or by limiting new 
development permits on coasts that are likely to experience sea-level 
rise.129 If the risks associated with vulnerability can be reduced 
 
 127. Vulnerability refers to “[t]he degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to 
cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes,” and 
resilience refers to “[a] capability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
significant multihazard threats with minimum damage to social well-being, the economy, and 
the environment.” INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, FEDERAL 
ACTIONS FOR A CLIMATE RESILIENT NATION 2 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/2011_adaptation_progress_report.pdf.  
 128. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 720 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adapt
ation_and_vulnerability.htm (“Adaptation to climate change takes place through adjustments to 
reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience in response to observed or expected changes in 
climate and associated extreme weather events.”); John Handmer & Stephen Dovers, A 
Typology of Resilience: Rethinking Institutions for Sustainable Development, in THE 
EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 187, 196 
(describing resilience and resistance as the opposite extremes of a continuum of possible 
responses to climate change); Nathan Hultman, Worth More Than Good Advice: Lessons of 
Hurricane Katrina for Development in a Changing Climate, 11 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 47, 49–50 
(2006) (“The first steps [in building resilience to natural disasters] involve executing the well-
worn mantras of the disaster-relief community: build better protective infrastructure, initiate 
and enforce building codes, reduce environmental degradation, set policy to discourage 
settlement in vulnerable areas, and coordinate the disaster response to get immediate aid to 
those most in need.”).  
 129. See JONATHAN ENSOR & RACHEL BERGER, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES 13–16 (2009) (delineating 
three different types of vulnerability to climate change and suggesting adaptations appropriate 
